Comparative research on violent conflict in the Basque Country and Ireland has yielded a sizable body of published academic work. Less well explored is the relationship between conflict transformation and cross-border cooperation in that comparative context. This paper provides a comparative examination of Third (non-public, non-profit) sector cross-border cooperation contributing to conflict transformation in the Basque (France/Spain) and Irish (UK/Ireland) borderscapes. The comparison is based on the premise that the European Union (EU) played a different role in both cases. In the Irish case, the EU contributed to the institutionalization of a peace process that included cross-border cooperation between Third sector organizations among its policy instruments contributing to conflict transformation. In the Basque case, the unilateral renunciation of violence by ETA (Euskadi eta Askatasuna) in 2010 did not generate the consistent involvement of the EU in an institutional peace process. However, some Third sector organizations became secondary foreign policy actors using EU instruments for cross-border economic, social and cultural cooperation between France and Spain in order to reinforce their cross-border networks, which indirectly impacted on conflict transformation.
Introduction
To what extent can the intensification of formal and informal cross-border cooperation (henceforth referred to a CBC) contribute to the process of conflict transformation in conflictual borderscapes? This core question will be addressed in the context of the Basque and the Irish borderscapes 1 . Through the borderscape conceptual lens (McCall 2013, p. 199) , the Basque and the Irish borderscapes are (a) border landscapes displaying cultural and political complexity, with a cross-border cultural identity; (b) socially constructed as shared territories by contested discourses and meanings, struggles over inclusion and exclusion, involving multiple actors: Basque and Irish nationalists advocating for "border transcending" dynamics, in contradistinction to state-driven dynamics which tend to be "border confirming" ; (c) important landscapes for cross-border relations, that may be favourable for inter-cultural dialogue advancing conflict transformation. Beyond these common features, the articulation between conflict transformation and the uses of the border is very distinct in both cases. In the Irish borderscape, North-South relations involve the two bordering states, as well as secondary foreign policy activities by the local authorities and are the key elements of an institutionalized peace process since the end of the 1990s. By contrast, the lack of involvement of the French and Spanish states in any institutionalized peace process has, to date, disconnected the issues of cross-border relations and conflict transformation. These different framings by the states also inform the distinct involvement of the EU in conflict transformation enterprises in the two borderscape contexts.
As a working hypothesis, we argue that CBC has experienced different processes of institutionalization in the Irish and the Basque cases, with very distinct roles played by the EU, having different effects on conflict transformation. CBC, in both cases, should not be seen as the miracle pill for conflict transformation. Rather the relationship between conflict transformation and CBC presents several, sometimes contradictory, aspects. In order to seize this pluralism, limiting the analysis to central, regional and local governmental actors would be reductive. On the contrary, we propose to observe how Third sector organizations as NGAs engage in secondary foreign policy by capturing CBC schemes and the potential consequences of this involvement for conflict transformation. By "Third sector", we mean the third 'non-public, nonprofit' sector as those organizations (associations, cooperatives or foundations) presenting a formal constitution, a legally private status, the presence of a form of self-government, the non-redistribution of profits and the presence of volunteers (Salamon and Anheier, 1995) . The uses of CBC schemes by local 'grassroots' actors are definitely plural and contingent, and cover very distinct results, ranging from their contribution to the constitution of effective cross-border network governance 2 to instrumental and "back-to-back" cooperation, with intermediate configurations.
Here, as in other conflictive border regions (see Wassenberg and Klatt's introduction), these contrasting uses of CBC result from a multiscalar action, associating EU, state and sub-state policy-makers. However, we argue that similarities and differences between both cases also need to be analysed through the cross-border activism of Third sector actors. We focus on CBC experiences led by the Third sector organizations. In Ireland, we will refer essentially to the community and voluntary sector. In the Basque case, we will consider the Third 'nonpublic, non-profit' sector, strictly speaking, as well as the cross-border configuration of 'social economy' oriented organizations (such as workers' cooperatives) which have a more developed economic activity but with limited redistribution of profits.
This empirical focus is justified in both cases. In the Basque case, Third sector organizations are located at the intersection between cross-border social movements related, in one way or another, to Basque identity and having a long experience of informal CBC, and policymakers aiming at the institutionalization of CBC through bilateral or EU cooperation schemes. These Third sector organizations (associations, cooperatives or foundations) are involved in cross-border activities in multiple sectors: Basque language and culture, but also local and sustainable development, small-scale farming and the social economy. In the Irish case, Third sector organizations also have a long experience of working cross-border and have had a central role in promoting intercultural dialogue to advance conflict transformation. Thus, the aim is to provide evidence-based research on cross-border cooperation and the role of the Third sector in a Europeanized form of cross-border network governance that would potentially have a conflict transformation effect.
Most of the Irish/Basque comparative research to date has been devoted to a comparison between militant nationalisms (Irvin 1999) , political violence and unconventional political participation (Justice 2005) , historical approaches to the rise of nationalism (Flynn 2000) , centre-periphery national conflicts (Letamendia 2001 , Keating 2001 , and conflict transformation processes (Bourne 2003; Alonso 2004; Bew, Frampton and Gurruchaga 2009; English 2009; Espiau 2010) . This consistent body of literature is focused on the central role played by identity politics in the two last violent ethno-nationalist conflicts in Western
Europe. While benefitting from this comparative base, the key added value of our research is its decentring approach through shifting the focus from governments, political parties and militant organizations to Third sector groups involved in cross-border cooperation (Kramsch and Hooper 2006) . In some instances, Third sector organizations can be pivotal in the framing of the "secondary foreign policy" undertaken specifically by non-central governments in conflictive borderscapes (see Wassenberg and Klatt's introduction). Identity politics are contextualised here as 'horizons of meaning' shared by the actors (Taylor 1992) .
Actors, in this sense, can become aware of their identity when they experience themselves as part of a whole, of a cultural framework of values which gives meaning to both individual and societal experiences. However, these horizons of meaning inform rather than provide the central focus for our research. Our focus remains on the substantive role played by Third sector organizations in CBC as conflict transformation. By doing so, we do not eliminate the role played by ethnonational, ethnoreligious and/or ethnolinguistic identities. On the contrary, we argue that in both cases identity has been and is still a crucial factor in the structuring of CBC/non-cooperation; but we do not focus primarily on the political institutions and organizations which have built their legitimacy on identity politics. Rather, our endeavour is to assess in a qualified manner the degree of influence identity plays in the involvement of Third sector organizations in CBC in both regions. This nuanced approach allows us to observe, in both cases, the involvement of the Third sector in identity-related issues (such as linguistic and cultural ones). But the close analysis of the governance networks shows that CBC schemes can also be used by Third sector and political actors having very distinct and/or instrumental uses of these schemes.
The research builds on continuous fieldwork conducted by the two authors in their respective borderscapes over the past two decades. In the Basque case, 33 interviews were conducted between 2013 and 2016 with public, private and Third sector organizations, on both sides of the border, involved in 26 projects funded by CBC programmes. This paper also draws on previous research conducted around language policy (Harguindéguy and Itçaina 2015) and cross-border social economy (Itçaina and Manterola 2013) Reimann states that "conflict transformation refers to outcome, process and structure oriented long-term peacebuilding efforts, which aim to truly overcome revealed forms of direct cultural and structural violence" (Reimann 2004, p. 10) . Michel Foucher also maintains that conflict transformation between states and between borderscape communities is a process that benefits from at least five components: a national and local political will to end conflict and embark on the process of its transformation; intergovernmental cooperation on infrastructure projects and building social capital between the hitherto conflictual parties; an international dimension to the conflict transformation process with third party international actors providing an oversight role; common commemorative projects, including an exchange of collective memories on a conflictual past; and sustained local level cross-border communication, contact and cooperation (Foucher 2007 ).
In the Irish borderscape, the cessation of violence provided the impetus for conflict According to Scenario 1 ("stick catalyst" effect), the EU sought to induce change by creating new external circumstances, events or processes that change the internal co-ordinates of the conflict. The "stick catalyst" constituted an attempt to pressure parties to a conflict to change their behaviour.
In According to the 2 nd scenario ("carrots"), the EU may also "seek to catalyse the resolution of conflict within EU member and applicant states by providing incentives encouraging parties to a conflict to eschew conflict or pursue compromise" (Bourne 2003, p. 398) . In Northern Ireland, the EU offered "carrots" to parties to the conflict through the provision of financial resources to promote cross-border and cross-community cooperation. Basque politicians had sought similar dispensation for the Basque country (Bourne, ibid .) The comparison with
Northern Ireland was not well received by the Commission, given that "Northern Ireland was much more seriously disadvantaged by terrorism and it had a much less developed economic base" (Bourne 2003, p. 399) . In 2006, the Basque Friendship Group was created in the European Parliament to promote the involvement of the EU in the Basque peace process, but with little impact given the opposition from French and Spanish governments.
The abertzale and peace movements (Elkarri-Lokarri) were more successful in internationalizing, rather than Europeanizing, the peace process through the monitoring of the Basque peace talks since 2010 by ad hoc groups (such as the International Contact Group) and transnational peace organizations.
The Irish process constituted a source of inspiration and a strategic resource to externalize the Basque cause for Basque parties and social movements, especially but not exclusively from the abertzale side (Espiau 2010 Incidentally, the development of CBC also contributed to pressuring French authorities to institutionalize partly the French Basque country (Letamendia 1997) . In the Irish case, the effective operation of the cross-border institutions has been stymied by British unionist ministers in Northern Ireland who are keen to curtail the development of these institutions lest they begin to resemble an embryonic form of All-Ireland governance. According to the 'Bourne model', the scenario 2 ('carrots') and 3 ('subversion') present evidence of the EU contribution to distinct forms of institutionalized CBC in both borderscapes. As a result, these new policy frameworks allowed the constitution of new cross-border governance networks, which included Third sector organizations.
The involvement of Third sector in EU cross-border cooperation and its impact on conflict transformation
In the first section, we have contrasted two distinct political framings of EU-sponsored CBC.
The Irish case evidences an EU-sponsored transformative (and politicized) CBC in the Irish borderscape, as constituting one of the key elements of the institutionalized peace process.
In the Basque case, an EU-sponsored functional (and depoliticized) CBC developed and achieved a consistent degree of institutionalization, with no direct connection to a peace process. These two contexts generated two distinct circumstances, opportunities and constraints for the Third sector.
The development of a cross-border institutional framework in the two borderscapes, as well as the role of the Third sector in the design and delivery of EU and other programmes, provides the architecture for the establishment of a form of network governance, allowing for processes of agenda-setting, devising and implementing public policies which are more flexible and transparent (Klijn and Skelcher 2007) .
The Third sector may be viewed to be at one remove from territorial government and better placed to network with local grassroots organizations. Being part of an hybrid economic sector located "between" market economy and public economy, Third sector organizations, whether they take the organizational forms of community groups, charities, associations, or cooperatives, …, benefit from a social and territorial anchoring that give them specific skills in mediation. On the island of Ireland, the ability of SEUPB and the Third sector to nurture a In both cases, the consolidation of territorial and CBC policy instruments in favour of minority languages had ambivalent effects. On the one hand, these instruments granted some institutional recognition to minority languages, thus contributing to defusing the issue by satisfying partially the language activists' claims. On the other hand, this emerging process of institutionalization of language was perceived by its opponents as a further concession made by policy-makers to one party to the conflict, the one advocating for the political and cultural unification of, respectively, Ireland and the Basque Country.
Beyond linguistic issues, local historical memory cross-border projects have been important Local historical memory cross-border projects were designed in two very distinct ways in both cases. In the Irish borderscape, these projects were designed within the peace process, and were funded as such, as a further attempt to overcome ethnonational divisions through re-examining the past. In the Basque borderscape, local historical memory cross-border projects were underpinned by two different sets of motivations. Local memory projects supported by institutional CBC funding aimed at re-building a shared memory on local cross- The consequences of the economic crisis were present, but to a lesser extent, in the Basque borderscape. However, and even if the Basque autonomous community and Navarra were in a relatively better situation than the rest of Spain, budget constraints decided by the regional authorities had also some consequences for CBC. Significantly, in 2013, the Navarrese government did not issue the Aquitaine-Navarre 2014 bilateral call for projects, prioritizing instead the preservation of jobs in the public sector 18 . As a result, unlike the Aquitaine-Euskadi Euroregion, the Aquitaine-Navarra common fund displayed an asymmetrical character, which raised doubts about its sustainability. These doubts were partially lifted with the slight improvement of the Spanish economic situation after 2014 and the 2015 political change in Navarra.
Conclusions
A first set of conclusions addresses the ambivalent role of ethnonational identities. In
Ireland, Irish nationalist and British unionist ethnonational identities have shifted in large part from a conflictual relationship based on antagonism to a working political relationship that may be described by agonism or adversarialism (Mouffe 2005) . Adversarialism still informs attitudes to CBC: nationalists are overwhelmingly in favour, unionists are much more wary and circumspect. However, Third Sector 'unionist' grassroots groups have engaged with many 'hard' infrastructural and 'soft' capital (conflict transformation) CBC projects. In the Basque borderscape as well, identity played the double role of resource and constraint for the establishment of cross-border networks of governance. First and despite an apparent paradox, initiatives motivated strongly by identity (minority language and culture, but also in sustainable farming and social economy), despite being constructed as alternatives to action by public authorities, are today effectively spearheading Third sector secondary foreign policy activities in cross-border governance networks. In the Basque case, the skills of identity activists, who are also experienced Third sector activists, have become a source of expertise for building a framework of public action which is now looking for projects that offer some structure. On the downside, Basque identity played a negative role by hindering the institutional relations between the regional governments of Euskadi and Navarra (before 2015), thus leading to separate agreements with their French regional counterpart. In other words, secondary foreign policy led by Third sector organizations may be encouraged, but also hindered, by central foreign policy carrying distinct approaches of identity and cross-border relations.
Secondly, in both territories, EU schemes were used to enhance CBC, but with different scopes. In the Irish borderscape, the participation of the Third Sector was seen as a crucial condition for conflict transformation, through cross-community and cross-border cooperation. In the Basque borderscape, the institutional framework for cross-border relations did not refer to a potential peace process that, since 2010, followed a separate political path. Rather, it provided a functional rationale for cross-border initiatives.
Nevertheless, Third Sector organizations used these new institutional opportunities in order to reinforce their previous identity-based cross-border networks.
Finally, the comparative effort undertaken in this paper needs to be extended to further sectors where the presence of Third sector organizations in cross-border matters is a relevant one. Social services, sports and leisure, workers' cooperatives, sustainable development initiatives, among others, should fall under our examination. Such an empirical extension would reinforce our general claim in favour of a new comparative design between two Western European borderscapes experiencing both a post-violent conflict situation, enduring identity-based territorial politics, a global economic and financial crisis, and a challenged perception of European integration as a functional resource for territorial development and as a source of legitimacy for minority rights. Focusing on the role played by the Third sector in the constitution, consolidation but also the fragility of cross-border governance networks provides one glimpse of the state of the European Union 'from below'.
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